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An Employer's Recourse to Wildcat Strikes Includes
Fashioning His Own Remedy: Section 301 Does
Not Sanction an Individual Damage Suit
An employer negotiating a collective bargaining agreement with
a union often seeks a promise of uninterrupted operation, usually a
no-strike clause. In exchange, the employer generally agrees to sub-
mit grievances to binding arbitration.' To enforce these collective
bargaining agreements, Congress enacted section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (Act).2 Section 301 provides a
federal forum for suits involving collective bargaining agreement vio-
lations,3 and suits against a union as an entity.4
The Act's purposes are: (1) to make collective bargaining agree-
ments binding on the employer and the union;5 and (2) to shield in-
dividual employees from personal liability for judgments against
their union.6 The Supreme Court of the United States, in Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 7 recently narrowed section 301 by holding
that an employer could not recover money damages from individual
union members who engage in an unauthorized (wildcat) strike in
1 Arbitration clauses occur in about ninety-six percent of sample collective bargaining
agreements, and no-strike clauses in about ninety-four percent. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AF-
FAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 15, 78 (9th ed. 1979).
2 Also referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Section 301 of the
Act provides in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect com-
merce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment
against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforce-
able only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not
be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
3 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976).
4 Id § 185(a).
5 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957).
6 See 92 CONG. REC. 5705 (1946) (Remarks of Sen. Taft); 93 CONG. Rc. 5014 (1947)
(Remarks of Sen. Ball); id at 6283 (Remarks of Rep. Case).
7 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 68 L.Ed.2d 248 (1981).
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breach of a no-strike contract clause.8
This note examines section 301 and union-employee violations
of collective bargaining agreements. Part I reviews the judicial inter-
pretation of section 301; part II analyzes the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Reis; part III critiques Reis; and part IV proposes solutions for
employee violations of collective bargaining agreements.
I. Judicial Interpretation of Section 301
The Supreme Court initially viewed section 301 as procedural,
merely granting federal court jurisdiction over all labor organization
controversies without regard to traditional federal jurisdictional re-
quirements.9 In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,10 the Court ex-
panded section 301, stating that it
expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points what the parties
may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in
the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack ex-
press statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy
of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that
policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by
the nature of the problem."
The Court concluded that federal courts must fashion from the poli-
cies underlying federal labor law the substantive law to be applied in
section 301 suits. Further, this law preempts state law when the two
are incompatible.' 2
The Supreme Court has considered section 301 in suits by a
union against an employer,' 3 an employer against a union,' 4 an em-
ployee against his union' 5 and against his employer, 16 and finally, an
employer against his employee.' 7
The Lincoln Mils decision permitted suit by a union against an
employer to enforce an arbitration commitment.' 8
8 Id at 261.
9 See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450 & n.1.
10 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
11 Id at 457.
12 Id; Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-103 (1962).
13 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
14 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
15 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Co., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
16 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
17 Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Complete Auto Transit, Inc., v.
Reis, 68 L.Ed.2d 248 (1981).
18 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,19 an employer en-
joined a union from striking in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement's no-strike clause. The Court limited this holding by only
allowing injunctions when the underlying dispute is arbitrable.20
This limitation was necessary because the Norris-LaGuardia Act
prohibits injunctions in suits arising out of labor disputes.2' Because
the Court felt that injunctions were necessary in certain situations,
they reconciled the newer Taft-Hartley Act with the older Norris-
LaGuardia Act. The Court justified the exception to the Norris-La-
Guardia Act by citing a shift in congressional emphasis from protect-
ing the infant labor movement, to encouraging collective bargaining
and administrative techniques for resolving industrial disputes.22
The Supreme Court has also held that section 301 affords an
individual employee the right to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement against his employer.2 3 Further, the Court has recognized
section 301 jurisdiction in employee suits against their union for
breaching the union's duty of fair representation.2 4
Employers have also sued employees for violations of collective
bargaining agreements with and without union authorization.2 5
The Supreme Court in Atkinson v. Sinclair Refinig Co. 26 held that
section 301(a) does not authorize a damages action against individ-
ual union members whose union authorized or caused a strike in vio-
lation of a no-strike clause.2 7 The Court determined that traditional
19 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
20 Id at 254.
21 Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976), provides in part that "[N]o court
of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit
any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute. .. ."
22 378 U.S. at 251. The Supreme Court had originally made this exception to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in Lincoln Mills, in dicta and without extensive discussion. It said "we see no
justification in policy for restricting section 301(a) to damage suits. . . ." 353 U.S. at 458-59.
23 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). The Court reasoned that
"[i]ndividual claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, are to a large
degree inevitably intertwined with union interests and many times precipitate grave questions
concerning the interpretation and enforceability of the collective bargaining contract on
which they are based." Id at 200.
24 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Co., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
25 Section 301 does not cover suits by a union against employees. Such suits involve
employee discipline, a subject generally covered by union constitutions.
26 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
27 Id at 247. In Atkinson, the employer-plaintiff brought a § 301 damage suit against the
union for authorizing and causing a strike in violation of a no-strike promise. The employer
also sought damages for tortious interference with contractual relations against the individual
members in their capacity as union agents. The Court found that the employer's charge
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agency principles, section 301(a)'s legislative history, and section
301(b)'s express language require that "when a union is liable for
damages for violation of a no-strike clause, its officers and members
are not liable for these damages. '28
The Court in Atkinson expressly reserved the question of union
member liability for violating a collective bargaining agreement
without union involvement. 29 The federal courts have since split in
their treatment of that issue. 30 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, in the leading case of Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil,
Chemical &Atomic Workers Int'l Union,31 probed the express language
and legislative history of section 301 and found that the section did
not expressly prohibit or authorize employer damage suits against
union wildcat strikers. Section 301, the Court determined, did evi-
dence the congressional intent of placing responsibility for collective
bargaining agreement breaches on the union and of protecting union
members from liability for union wrongs. Congress did not intend to
sanction suits against employees, so the Court limited the employer's
remedies to discipline and discharge of wildcat strikers. 32
Several federal district courts have allowed damage suits against
individual union employees striking without union authorization. 33
against the individuals in their official capacity merely restated the union's liability. Id at
249.
28 Id
29 Id at 249 n.7.
30 Cases holding against wildcat strikers liability under § 301 are Putnam Fabricating
Co. v. Null, 631 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2314 (1981); United Steelwork-
ers v. Lorain, 616 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2313 (1981); Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F.2d 1110 (6th Cir. 1980), afd, 68 L.Ed.2d 248 (1981); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971); West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. v. Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 470 F. Supp. 1298 (W.D. Pa.
1979).
Cases allowing damage suits under § 301 against wildcat strikers are Certain-Teed Corp.
v. United Steelworkers, 484 F. Supp. 726 (M.D. Pa. 1980); United Teachers v. Thompson,
459 F. Supp. 667 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 429 F. Supp.
445 (N.D. Ohio 1977); DuQuoin Packing Co. v. Meat Cutters Local P-156, 321 F. Supp. 1230
(E.D. Il1. 1971).
31 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971). In Sinclair, the plaintiff-employer sought damages from
individual workers who refused to cross a picket line maintained by a different bargaining
unit of the same union. The employees violated a no-strike agreement and defied express
union directions to cross the picket line. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers, 470 F. Supp. 1298, 1299 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (district courts adopting Sinc/airS'
holding).
32 452 F.2d at 54. The Fourth Circuit, convinced by Sinc/air's reasoning as well as nine
years of congressional inaction, reached the same result in Putnam Fabricating Co. v. Null,
631 F.2d 311, 313 (4th Cir. 1980).
33 In DuQuoin Packing Co. v. Meat Cutters Local P-156, 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Ill.
1971), the court held individual employees liable for damages. It reasoned that Congress
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However, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, the Supreme Court re-
solved the issue, holding that section 301 does not sanction damage
suits against individual employees for breach of a no-strike clause.34
In Reis, three plaintiff-employers signed identical collective bar-
gaining agreements with the Teamster's Union. The agreement con-
tained a no-strike clause and subjected all disputes to a binding
grievance and arbitration procedure. The defendants were the plain-
tiffs' employees, who staged a wildcat strike because the union alleg-
edly failed to properly represent them in negotiations for
amendments to the agreement. The employers brought a section 301
suit against the employees only, seeking an injunction and damages.
enacted § 301 to prevent damage suits where union involvement existed, a Danbuy Hatters
situation. (The Danbury Hatters cases, Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915), and Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), involved an illegal union-directed boycott of an employer's hats.
The Supreme Court levied a treble damage antitrust judgment against the union and at-
tached individual union members' homes to satisfy the employer's losses. Congress enacted
§ 301 to avoid such measures against employees. 93 CONG. REc. 5014 (1946) (remarks of Sen.
Ball)). The DuQuoin court also found that individual liability afforded unions proper control
over their members and was consistent with the policy of enforcing no-strike clauses. 321 F.
Supp. at 1233.
In United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978), the court allowed a
damage suit against union employees because the usual remedies of discipline and discharge
were not available since the employees had resigned. Thompson involved a collective bargain-
ing agreement that required teachers on sabbatical to return to work after their leave for at
least a corresponding length of time. The agreement required pro-rata leave expenses to be
paid into a fund by any employee who did not return or remained for a time shorter than his
leave. The employer sued two teachers who resigned immediately after their leave had
ended.
A Pennsylvania District Court adopted Thompson's reasoning in Certain-Teed Corp. v.
United Steelworkers, 484 F. Supp. 726 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
The Third Circuit did not consider the question in Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine-
workers, 570 F.2d 467, 478 (3rd Cir. 1978). The court, however, in dictum, remarked that
individuals could not be held liable, citing Atkinson and Sinclair. Thus, the Third Circuit
would probably agree with Reir.
The court in Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 429 F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Ohio
1977), relying on some isolated language from two Supreme Court cases, held that "where
there is no actionable violation by the unions, the court is not foreclosed from hearing and
deciding whether individual members violated the contract." Id at 451. In the first case cited
by the court, Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), the Supreme Court said that
§ 301 was to be interpreted broadly so as not to prevent an individual employee from suing
his employer for damages for breaching the collective bargaining agreement. In the second
case, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976), the Court said that "§ 301
contemplated suits by and against individual employees as well as between union and em-
ployers. . . ." In Reis, the Sixth Circuit distinguished the Smith language while criticizing
Alloy Cast Steel because the issue before the Court was one of jurisdiction, not whether § 301
created a cause of action. 614 F.2d at 1116. The Sixth Circuit said the language in Hines did
not compel allowing an individual damage suit, because Hines dealt with an employee action
against his employer. Id
34 68 L.Ed.2d at 261.
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The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the
strike was not arbitrable because it was an internal dispute between a
union and its members and denied the plaintiff's request to enjoin
the strikers. The union and strikers then resolved their differences
leaving only the question of amnesty for the strikers in dispute be-
tween the employers and the union. The district court found this
dispute arbitrable and enjoined the strike. Nine months later, the
same court granted the strikers' motion to dissolve the injunction 35
and dismissed the claim for damages, relying on Sinclair.36 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the damage action dismissal, also adopting the Sev-
enth Circuit's interpretation of section 301 in Sinclair. The Supreme
Court granted the case certiorari. 37
II. Reis: No Individual Liability for Union Members
Because section 301 did not furnish the necessary substantive
law, the Supreme Court, in adhering to its Lincoln Mills mandate,38
delved into the section's legislative policy to fashion an effective judi-
cial remedy. 39 Further, under Atkinson, the Court was bound to give
substantial deference to congressional intent,4° which it traced in
reaching its decision in Reis. The Court examined the history of sec-
tion 10 of the Case Bill,41 which was vetoed by President Truman in
1946. Section 10 was the "direct antecedent" of section 301 and con-
tained similar provisions.42 In passing the Case Bill, the House and
Senate "clearly intended to protect employees from the sanction of a
suit for damages . ..whether or not the union participated in or
authorized the strike."43
35 Because the focus of this note is individual liability, the injunction portion of the deci-
sion is not pursued.
36 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
37 101 S.Ct. 265 (1980).
38 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
39 See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
40 See Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 248-49.
41 H.R. REP. No. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 68 L.Ed.2d at 256 n.7.
42 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 (1962). The Court found that
because § 10 and § 301 were substantially the same, § 10's legislative history is highly relevant
in ascertaining congressional intent concerning § 301. Id at 511-12.
43 68 L.Ed.2d at 248. The Court based this finding on statements by Senator Taft that
workers who strike in violation of their no-strike agreement are not protected by the Act and
are subject to discharge. Id at 256 (citing 92 CONG. REc. 5705-06 (1946)). Because the Sena-
tor did not say that individuals were to be held liable in damages for engaging in unauthor-
ized strikes, the Court reasoned that such was not intended. Rather, it reasoned that the
opposite was intended.
The irony of the Court's reasoning was noted in Justice Rehnquist's dissent. Id at 267
n.2. He chided the Court for using "negative implication," which the Court itself had cau-
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Six months after the Case Bill was vetoed, Representative Case
introduced a bill that evolved into section 301. He said the bill "had
no provision for suing individual workers, as such, or rendering any
judgment against them." 44
By examining section 10's history, the Supreme Court found
that Congress' intent in enacting section 301 evidenced their antipa-
thy for individual union member liability for union actions over
which they had no control,4 5 as in Danbug Hatters.4 6
Although Congress, in enacting section 301, focused on avoiding
a repeat of Danbury Hatters,47 the Court cited legislative history which
indicated that Congress may have considered individual liability for
unauthorized strikes.48 A proposed House Bill that the Senate re-
jected contained a provision creating a damages action against "any
person engaging in an unlawful concerted activity. '49 Based upon
this bill's rejection, the Case Bill's legislative history, and Congress'
hostility toward individual liability where the union is involved, the
Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not intend to sanction
employer damage actions against individual employees for violating
a collective bargaining agreement, whether or not the union was in-
volved. Congress intended this result, the Court said, "even though
it might leave the employer unable to recover for his losses." '50
The plaintiffs contended that this result would not "insure the
continued integrity of the collective bargaining process by serving as
tioned against in the majority opinion. Id at 255. In an earlier case, the Court had warned
that "it is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a control-
ling rule of law." Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
The Court also emphasized Representative Case's statement on the House floor that
[Individual members of a union are not made liable for any money judgment, I
might point out, but only the union as an entity. If employees strike in violation of
their agreement, the only individual penalty that can be employed is the forfeiture
of their right to employment under that contract which is cured when the employer
reemploys them.
92 CONG. REC. 5930-31 (1946).
This statement referred to the portion of the Case Bill that provided for loss of employee
status for wildcat strikers. Senate Amendment No. 3 to H.R. REP. No. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1946). Besides showing that Congress intended that any remedy against an employee in
an unauthorized strike be limited to discharge, it is equally clear that the Case Bill debates
focused on situations concerning union involvement.
44 68 L.Ed.2d. at 257 n.10.
45 Id at 267 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
46 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
47 Id
48 68 L.Ed.2d at 258.
49 Id Unlawful concerted activity includes "jurisdictional strikes, sympathy strikes and
certain picketing activities." Id
50 Id at 255. But see id at 267 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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a strong deterrent to recalcitrant parties who refuse to fulfill their
obligations" under the agreement. 51
In a lengthy footnote, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
responded that "it is by no means certain that an individual damages
remedy [would] meaningfully increase deterrence of wildcat strikes"
any more than the "significant array of other remedies" already
available to employers.52 Justice Brennan listed remedies including
an employer damage action against the union if the union was in-
volved; discharge or discipline of the employees; union discipline of
the employees; and injunctive relief.53
In a biting dissent, Chief Justice Burger criticized the majority
for creating a "special, privileged class who may with impunity vio-
late an agreement voluntarily reached in arm's-length bargaining."5 4
The Chief Justice reasoned that since Congress, in the legislative his-
tory of section 301 and the express language of section 301 (b), never
addressed the unauthorized individual liability question, the com-
mon law contract law of accountability for one's actions should ap-
ply.55 In response to the Court's other suggested remedies, he said
they "are no answer; they may be too little and they surely come too
late, after the employer has suffered substantial losses to its business
due to a strike that, under the contract, never should have oc-
cured."'56 Chief Justice Burger charged that the Court's holding pe-
nalized the employer for the wildcat strikes and rewarded the errant
employees. 57
51 Brief for Petitioner at 26-27, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 68 L.Ed.2d 248
(1981). The plaintiffs in Reis argued that by allowing a damages action against individual
employees, the Court would be appropriately filling the void between Atkinson v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), and Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S.
212 (1979). Alkinson held that union members are not liable in their individual capacity for
union wrongs, while Carbon Fuel held that the union is not liable for the employee's action
unless an agency relationship is established.
52 68 L.Ed.2d at 260 n.18. Before listing the "other remedies," Justice Brennan added
that "[i]t is just as likely that damages actions against individuals would exacerbate industrial
strife: 'an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute would only tend to
aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer
arid union' Id (citing the language he used in Boys Markets to support injunctive relief dur-
ing a strike rather than a damages remedy against a union after the parties settle the dispute).
53 68 L.Ed.2d at 260 n.18.
54 Id at 266.
55 Id at 266-67.
56 Id at 268.
57 Id at 269. The Chief'Justice's premise is that since § 301's legislative history does not
address the question before the Court, then it should be dealt with under the common law of
contracts. However, because this suit was brought for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, it is admittedly within the purview of§ 301. See Lincoln Mis, 353 U.S. at 451-52. Due
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III. Critique of Reis
The majority's interpretation of section 10 of the Case Bill, sec-
tion 301's legislative history, and the sufficiency of an employer's
remedies is debatable. In discussing section 10, Representative Case
remarked that its purpose was "to establish a mutual responsibility
when the collective-bargaining process has resulted in a contract." 58
The Congressman did not clarify which parties were subject to the
mutual responsibility. He explained that section 10 suits are limited
to the recognized bargaining agent and the employer, rather than the
individual. 59 If Congress intended the mutual responsibility to ex-
tend between the employer and union only, perhaps section 10 did
not contemplate individual unauthorized strikes. But if Congress in-
tended the mutual responsibility to extend to all the agreement's par-
ties, including the individual employee, then insulating the
individual from liability for his own breaches does not foster section
10's purpose as enunciated.
Section 301's legislative history is also subject to varying inter-
pretations.60 Representative Case noted the absence of a provision
for suing individuals.6' The majority interpretated this as an indica-
tion of congressional intent to preclude individual liability. If it was
worthy of mention, it would seem a provision would have been ad-
ded expressly precluding such liability.
Further, throughout section 301's legislative history runs a con-
gressional concern to avoid the Danbu9 , Hatters situation. 62 A signifi-
cant factual distinction exists between Danbu, Hatters, which
involved union-authorized action, and Reir-type cases involving indi-
vidual unauthorized action only.63 Despite the Court's decision in
to the unique nature of labor law, the Court mustfashion from the policy of the labor laws a
body of federal law for enforcing collective bargaining agreements. Id at 457. Thus, even
though there are situations where ordinary common law could arguably apply, such as here,
it must be subservient to federal labor law principles. "The subject matter of § 301(a) is
peculiarly one that calls for uniform law." Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
103 (1962).
58 92 CoNG. REc. 838 (1946)(Remarks of Rep. Case).
59 Id at 766 (Remarks of Rep. Case).
60 "The legislative history of § 301 is cloudy and confusing." Lincoln Millr, 353 U.S. at
452 (1957).
61 See 68 L.Ed.2d at 257 n.10.
62 See note 33 supra.
63 For articles emphasizing the factual differences see, Kozub, Wildcat Stikers: Individual
Liabiliy Under Section 301?, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 671 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Kozub];
Note, Labor Law, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1657 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Labor Law Note];




Reis, it is unclear whether Congress intended to preclude damages
actions in only the former or in both situations.
In his concurrence, Justice Powell also identifies additional
problems with the majority's reasoning. In particular, he asserts that
the employer's "array of other remedies" cited by the majority are
"largely chimerical. ' 64 Justice Powell criticized each of the remedies.
The Reis majority claimed that union responsibility for a con-
tract breach does not warrant an individual damages suit because an
"employer may seek damages against the union where responsibility
may be traced to the union for the contract breach. ' 65 This offers no
assistance, however, where the union is not responsible for the
breach, the situation in Reis.66 Moreover, practical reasons make this
alternative unattractive. Justice Powell points out that a union can-
not be held liable absent proof that it authorized or ratified a strike,
and that it is a foolish union that would provide such proof.6 7 Also,
the discovery procedure attendant to a lawsuit against a union could
expose an employer's financial and management secrets. But even if
the employer bears that risk and wins the lawsuit, he may find the
union local to be judgment-proof.68 In addition, a damage suit
against the union may poison relations at subsequent negotiations. 69
Secondly, the Court stated that an employer may discharge or
otherwise discipline an employee who unlawfully walks off the job.70
Although this alternative may be feasible under certain circum-
stances, and arguably has a limited deterrent effect, 7t it has at least
64 68 L.Ed.2d at 261 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
65 Id at 261 n.18.
66 See id at 268 n.3. The plaintiffs pleaded that the "work stoppage and tie-up of equip-
ment has been participated in, encouraged and caused by Defendants. . . without the aid
and assistance or authorization of the union." Joint Appendix to Writ of Certiorari at 8,
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 68 L.Ed.2d 248 (1981).
67 68 L.Ed.2d at 265 (citing Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. 212 (1979)).
68 Id at 264-65 n.9 & n.10.
69 See Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions' Narrowing Path to Rectitude?, 50 IND. L.J. 472,
474 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Whitman].
70 68 L.Ed.2d at 261 n.18. This is true because a strike in breach of contract is unpro-
tected conduct under the National Labor Relations Act and subjects the striker to discharge.
See 68 L.Ed.2d at 263 (citing NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939)).
71 For example, in inflationary times when jobs are scarce and there is a ready supply of
replacement workers who would be willing to cross a picket line, employees are less likely to
risk discharge by illegally striking. The remedy is attractive in this situation because dis-
charging illegal strikers may not economically harm the employer. Discharged or striking
workers initially may have the same effect on the employer, because in either circumstance
the employer has workers off the job. But discharge adds the deterrent of eliminating the
worker's choice about working as well as eliminating any union strike pay he might receive
during an authorized strike.
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three drawbacks, according to Justice Powell. Discharges may crip-
ple production; the time and expense involved in hiring and training
new skilled workers "may very well sound the death knell of the busi-
ness." 72 Second, the Board has found that selectively discharging
workers because of their union status is illegal. The Board held that
an employer cannot more harshly discipline a union officer than
other strikers, even where the officer breaches a contractual commit-
ment to help terminate strikes. 73 The Seventh Circuit, however, in
denying enforcement of a Board decision disallowing stricter disci-
pline of a union officer, said that an employer can discipline a union
official more harshly because the employer is "entitled to take into
account the union official's greater responsibility and hence greater
fault."' 74 An employer therefore may be able to discipline a union
officer more harshly when the officer is contractually bound to aid in
terminating the strike. 75 But these practices are unlikely to influence
the rank and file to return to work and may prolong the strike by
aggravating worker discontent. 76 Finally, arbitrators may refuse to
sustain a striker discharge as being too severe a penalty. 77
Union discipline of members was the Court's third suggested
remedy. 78 Such an attempt would probably be futile, since a wildcat
strike shows a union's inability to control its members. Carbon Fuel
also held that a union, absent a contractual commitment, has no
duty to take affirmative steps to end a wildcat strike.79 "Absent such
an obligation, there is little incentive for the union to intervene, even
where intervention would be useful."80
Finally, the Court said that an employer may seek injunctive
72 68 L.Ed.2d at 263-64 & n.7. See also Fishman & Brown, Union Responsibiiy for Wildcat
Stn'kes, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1017, 1021 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Fishman].
73 See 68 L.Ed.2d at 264 n.7. (citing Miller Brewing Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No.24 (1981);
South Central Bell Telephone Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (1981); Precision Casting Co., 233
N.L.R.B. 183 (1977)).
74 Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979) (denying en-
forcement of 237 N.L.R.B. 226 (1978)).
75 See also Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728 (3rd Cir. 1979) (denying enforcement of
237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978)), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 247 (1980).
76 Returning strikers may insist that their discharged colleagues be reinstated as a condi-
tion to returning to work. 68 L.Ed.2d 264 (citing Fishman, supra note 72 at 1022).
77 68 L.Ed.2d at 264 (citing Handsaker & Handsaker, Remedies and Penalties for Wildcat
Strikes: How Arbitrators and Federal Courts Have Ruled, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 279, 284 (1973)).
78 68 L.Ed.2d at 261 n. 18. Although seldom used, most unions have the power to disci-
pline members. Id at 264 (citing Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Disciph'ne, 64 HARV. L.
REV. 1049, 1065 (1951)).
79 444 U.S. 212 (1979). See also Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 311 (1948).
80 68 L.Ed.2d at 264 (Powell, J., concurring in part). The Court recognized in Carbon
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relief against the union for breach of a no-strike provision where the
underlying dispute is subject to binding arbitration.81 This is irrele-
vant though, where as in Reis, the union had not breached the collec-
tive bargaining agreement's no-strike clause, the individual wildcat
strikers had.82
Further, the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits courts from en-
joining "any person or persons" from participating in certain labor-
related activities.83 Boys Markets provides a limited exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, allowing injunctions where the underlying
dispute giving rise to the breach is subject to binding arbitration, the
agreement contains a mandatory arbitration clause and ordinary eq-
uitable principles are present.84 But Boys Markets only provides nar-
row relief and does not apply to situations that do not meet its
specifications.85 The case seems to apply only to unions, thus leaving
doubt as to whether its injunction exception applies to individual
wildcat strikers.86 The injunction remedy also fails, Justice Powell
added, because workers usually will not obey it, courts are reluctant
to impose contempt penalties and, if ordered, such penalties may be
difficult'to enforce.87
The vapid nature of the remedies in Reis dissipates an em-
ployer's incentive to agree to binding arbitration. The remedies are
available if the employees individually breach the collective bargain-
ing agreement, but these remedies offer little solace when his business
has perished because of a wildcat strike. Reis also may diminish
union bargaining power because the union cannot totally guarantee
against an unauthorized strike. Finally, Reis may even promote an
atmosphere where employees believe they have rights but not respon-
sibilities under the agreement.88 This is unfortunate because Con-
Fuel that the collective bargaining agreement can provide for a union's duty to affirmatively
intervene to end a strike. 444 U.S. 212, 219 (1979).
81 68 L.Ed.2d at 261 n.18.
82 See note 66 supra.
83 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
84 398 U.S. at 253-54.
85 E.g. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) (injunction not
available in sympathy strikes).
86 For an argument that injunctions should lie against individual strikers see Labor Law
Note, supra note 63 at 1671-74.
87 68 L.Ed.2d at 263. Court fines against individual strikers for disobeying an injunctive
order, though apt to be more reasonable, are reminiscent of Danbugi Hatters. See Note, Labor
Law--Strikes-Individual Union Members Not Liable for Breach of Contractual No-Strike Clause Even
When Strike Unauthorized By Union, 86 HARV. L. REV. 447, 455-56 (1972).
88 See Givens, Liability oflndividualEmployeesfor, Wildcat Strikes?, 4 AMP. REL. L.J. 552, 553
(1979).
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gress was especially interested in promoting collective bargaining
that resulted in no-strike agreements.89
Labor commentators should be alert for indications whether the
Court's holding will have a demonstrative effect on the prevalence
and substance of no-strike/grievance-arbitration clauses.90
IV. Alternatives to an Individual Damage Suit
Under Section 301
An employer faced with a wildcat strike usually does not have
an effective remedy,91 but before that walk-out ever occurs, the em-
ployer may be able to protect himself through foresight at the bar-
gaining table.
Prior to negotiations, employers should realize that in the wake
of Reis they may be relinquishing independent authority by agreeing
to submit to arbitration in exchange for a union's toothless no-strike
promise. The union cannot guarantee that an unauthorized strike
will not occur, but merely that it promises not to contribute to one.92
An employer's most effective remedy against wildcat strikes
must be secured at the negotiating table in the form of a union guar-
antee of uninterrupted operation during the agreement. Only in this
way will the employer receive the quid pro quo for his concessions.93
In construing such an agreement, the courts will look to its language
to ascertain the parties' intent.94 Therefore, an explicit clause is nec-
cesary providing the employer with relief if individual employees
89 "Statutory recognition of a collective bargaining agreement as a valid, binding and
enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a higher degree of respon-
sibility upon the parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote industrial peace." S.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1947).
90 More reason now exists for creative negotiating and contract drafting to achieve the
genuine "quid pro quo" that was originally desired. See text accompanying notes 93-108.
91 "It is increasingly clear that the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments did not provide em-
ployers with an effective remedy for wildcat strikes." 68 L.Ed.2d at 263 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part).
92 See Comment, Parent Union Liabilityfor Strikers in Breach of Contract, 67 CAL- L. REV.
1028, 1045 (1979). Justice Powell noted in his Reir concurrence that "[s]trike encouragement
sometimes is explicit, but more often is cryptic. A union may employ subtle signals to convey
the message to strike. One court noted that unions sometimes employ 'a nod or a wink or a
code ... in place of the word strike'." 68 L.Ed.2d at 262 (citing United States v. UMW, 77
F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C.), a fd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 871
(1949)).
93 In United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960), the Court
called the employer's agreement to arbitrate the "quid pro quo" for the union's promise not
to strike.
94 See Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 14 LAB. L.J.
1016, 1020-1023 (1963); Whitman, supra note 69, at 479.
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'breach the collective bargaining agreement. Two clauses could be
used-the first allowing an arbitrator's money award against individ-
ual employees for damages caused to the employer, and the second
requiring the union to use its "best efforts" to terminate wildcat
strikes.
A. The Arbitration Clause
The first clause would empower an arbitrator to determine the
applicable employer remedy against the individual employee, includ-
ing discipline, discharge or monetary compensation for employer
losses. If the arbitrator awarded a cash judgment and the employees
refused to pay, the employer could seek judicial enforcement. 95 The
suit would be brought under section 301 to enforce an arbitrator's
award rather than pursue an individual damages suit, which is for-
bidden by Reis.96 The Supreme Court has said that the parties are
free to draft the arbitration clause as broadly or narrowly as they
wish, since arbitration is a creature not of federal law, but of volun-
tary agreement. 97 Also, courts generally defer to an arbitrator's deci-
sion,98 and cannot review the merits of arbitral awards "lest they
undermine the federal policy of settling disputes peacefully through
arbitration." 99
This suggested clause may be attacked as violating the substance
of Reir because it may require an individual employee to pay money
to an employer for striking in breach of a no-strike clause. That ar-
gument overlooks the crucial "buffer" effect given by an arbitrator.
The arbitrator is "usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in
his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his
personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not ex-
pressed in the contract."c ° He could use his expert knowledge of
plant customs and practices in determining the most equitable re-
95 e General Dynamics Corp. v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Work-
ers, 469 F.2d 848, 851 (Ist Cir. 1972) (court can judicially enforce an arbitrator's award). Se
also R. GORMAN, LABOR LAw, 619-20 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as GORMAN].
96 See Kozub, supra note 63, at 685.
97 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). See also
GORMAN, supra note 95, at 552.
98 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (an arbi-
trator's award must be enforced if it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment even though the court may disagree with the result). See genera4'y Wollett, The Agreement
and the National Labor Relations Act: Courts, Arbitrators and NLRB- Who Decides What?, 14 LAB.
LJ. 1041 (1963).
99 See GORMAN, supra note 95, at 555.
100 Id
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suit.10' Moreover, the employer and union at the next round of ne-
gotiations would review his decisions.
It could also be argued that the union is without power to sub-
ject its members to possible liability; that such a clause is an "illegal
subject"102 and thus improper in a collective bargaining agreement.
In NLRB v. Magnavox,10 3 the Supreme Court nullified a union's
promise to the employer that enabled the employer to prohibit em-
ployee distribution of literature on company premises. The Court
found that the union was protecting its own interests at the expense
of its members by not giving them the opportunity for "full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing. '1 0 4
A clause allowing an arbitrator to assess the necessary remedy
for an unauthorized strike would not deprive employees of any rights
which Magnavox deemed important. The risk that wildcat strikers
might be held liable for damages balances off against the arbitration-
grievance procedure to which the employer and union, the employ-
ees' recognized bargaining agent, agreed. Further, the employees can
use the arbitration mechanism to resolve problems which might
otherwise precipitate a wildcat strike. Employees could still strike to
protest unfair labor practices,10 5 and they are protected from individ-
ual liability when they participate in a union-directed strike. 0 6
Giving an arbitrator such power is conceivably an "illegal sub-
ject" because it is contrary to the public policy enunciated by the
Supreme Court in construing section 301's legislative history. How-
ever, determining that the Supreme Court intended a broad declara-
tion of public policy is presumptive because the Court was examining
a narrow legislative enactment, section 301. Also, in interpretating
section 301, the Court arguably did not scan the entire labor picture
and weigh any competing policies.
101 Id
102 See id. at 529-31. The subjects are considered illegal because they are contrary to the
interest of the public or the employees. Cases involving illegal subjects are: UMW v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (clause requiring a union to extract a wage from competing
employers to drive them out ofbusiness); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (illegal
disparate treatment of white and black workers); Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 140
N.L.R.B. 1103 (1963), modified, 331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964)
(granting "superseniority" credit to strikebreakers unlawfully discriminates against those en-
gaging in union activities).
103 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
104 Id at 325-26 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
105 Lincoln Mils, 353 U.S. at 281.
106 Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 248-49.
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Even if the Supreme Court intended a broad policy statement, it
must be weighed against the competing public policies of industrial
peace, self-government and encouragement of the collective bargain-
ing agreement and the arbitration process. Although the interests of
individual employees are not insignificant, the broader public poli-
cies should prevail, allowing such clauses in collective bargaining
agreements.107
B. The "Best Efforts" Clause
A second contractual alternative for an employer is a clause re-
quiring a union to use its "best efforts" to end an unauthorized strike.
This would require a good-faith attempt by the union to solve the
dispute and bring the strikers back to work. An obvious problem
would be defining "best efforts."'' 08 The inquiry would probably re-
quire a case by case analysis, weighing among other things, why the
strike began; what the union or employer did to avert or cause the
strike; and what the union did to end the strike once it began. This
balancing test would determine if the union acted reasonably with
due diligence using its "best efforts."
It may also be necessary for management to explicitly define
when it requires the union's best efforts. In addition to delineating
specific foreseeable situations, boilerplate language including "situa-
tions unanticipated at contract time" may prove beneficial.
C. Other Alternatives
In addition to contractual alternatives, an injunction can be an
effective remedy, since enjoining the strikers in the strike's early
stages can prevent severe financial loss. But courts generally do not
grant injunctions unless the dispute that precipitated the work stop-
page involves an arbitrable issue.109 The collective bargaining agree-
ment, however, could provide that any and all disputes are arbitrable.Such a provision could circumvent the Boys Markets limitations and
give employers injunctive relief. This type of provision must be read
107 Assuming such a clause would not offend public policy, it is difficult to determine
whether a union would accept it. In the coal industry, where wildcat strikes are frequent, the
unions might not be receptive to the clause.
108 It may be possible to analogize "best efforts" in the labor context to that in the com-
mercial context. U.C.C. § 2-306 requires buyers and sellers to use best efforts to promote and
supply goods in output and requirements contracts. The Official Comment to the section
emphasizes a reasonable effort with due diligence made in good faith. Such terms would be
judged according to the particular fact situation and general industry standards.
109 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253-54.
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with the union guarantee of uninterrupted operation; otherwise an
injunction against the union would have no effect when the strike is
not union authorized. 110
Finally, it is uncertain whether Congress will react to Reir with
legislation allowing individual damage suits. Such legislation could
provide for ceiling limitations on individuals' liability or allow suits
only in certain equitable circumstances, such as when the wildcat
strike causes an employer to go bankrupt, thereby vitiating his in-
junction, discipline and discharge remedies. However, if the
Supreme Court has accurately gleaned Congress' intent, it is doubt-
ful that employers will find relief in prospective legislation.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has decided that our national labor policy
mandates that individuals who violate a collective bargaining agree-
ment's no-strike clause without union authorization should not be
held accountable in damages to their employer.1 Nor can the
union be held liable unless it has instigated, supported, ratified or
encouraged the strike.' 12 The Court has stated that traditional reme-
dies are available to protect the employer in these instances. In real-
ity, these remedies are oftentimes neither available nor effective.
The Supreme Court's decision in Reir states only that an indi-
vidual cannot be sued for money damages when he violates a no-
strike clause. The holding does not expressly preclude a suit to en-
force an arbitrator's award or other contractual undertakings, or an
individual damage suit for violating provisions other than the no-
strike clause.
Employers must act prior to strikes to incorporate clauses into
collective bargaining agreements that will protect them in the event
of unauthorized walkouts. Examples are a clause empowering an
arbitrator to ascertain an adequate remedy, or one requiring the
union to use its "best efforts" to end a strike. Although such provi-
sions may not be readily accepted by the union, this alternative lends
itself to vigorous, thoughtful and creative negotiations that will en-
hance the quality of collective bargaining, and result in each party
receiving his quid pro quo. Enhanced collective bargaining can only
110 See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
111 Reir, 68 L.Ed.2d 248 (1981).
112 Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
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aid in promoting orderly labor relations which yield industrial peace
and harmony.
Donald Robert Strumillo
